Jungle Expert Patch (Black & Gold) 4 1/2" Wax Back - Green Hell - Panama

Description: Jungle Expert Patch Jungle Expert Patch (Black & Gold) 4 1/2" Wax Back - Green Hell - Panama - JOTC JUNGLE EXPERT SCHOOL WAS LOCATED HERE FROM 1953 to 1999 HOME OF THE JUNGLE OPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER (JOTC) The Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC) consists of 23,000 acres of single and double canopy jungle. JOTC provides the United States Army the only jungle environment to train infantry units in the art of jungle warfare. Fort Sherman is surrounded on the North and North-West by the Caribbean Sea, on the South and South-West by the Rio Chagres and the East by Limon Bay and the Gatun Lake. The cross-compartmentalized terrain on the JOTC consists of rolling hills, numerous tributaries, mangrove swamps and coastline. This training area is a unique and challenging training environment. The USAJOTB operations section (S3) was responsible for coordinating all training on Fort Sherman. The 11 Infantry, 11 OPFOR companies, 4 engineer companies, and 4 aircrew survival courses made the administration of this premier training center intense. Additional, non-rotational units, use the JOTC regularly and ensure year round usage. While Army units comprised the lion share of users, Air Force, Navy, Marines, Reserve and National Guard units all received jungle warfare training at the JOTC. Aside from rotational units. The Jungle Warfare Course (JWC) is a three week training event designed in a building block approach. The first week of training consists of individual soldier tasks and squad collective tasks (for the infantry companies), that are likely to be performed in a jungle environment. These tasks include: Jungle Living, Jungle Antennas, Land Navigation, Mines and Booby Traps (M&BT), jungle Combat Techniques (JCT), Waterborne Training, Squad React to Contact (Live Fire), and Squad Area Reconnaissance. Additionally in week one, the battalion’s specialty platoons (Scout, Mortar, and Engineer) conduct training prepared specially for them. Specialized training for the Scout Platoon includes: A Quick Fire (Live Fire) Course, Squad React to Contact, Battle Drills (Live Fire), Mines and Booby Traps (M&BT), Small Boat Operations, Rappelling, Intelligence Indicators, Pathfinder Operations, as well as the normal infantry Individual tasks. Specialized training for the Mortar Platoon/Sections includes: Mortar Jungle Combat Techniques, M&BT, Mortar Maneuver Course (Live Fire), as well as the normal infantry individual tasks. Specialized training for the Engineer Platoon includes: Field Expedient Demolition (Live Fire) Training, M&BT, JCT, Small Boat Operations, as well as the normal infantry individual tasks. Week two training consists of Situational Training Exercises (STXs) conducted at the Platoon and Company Level. Examples of these STXs included: Platoon Raids, Company Area Ambushes, Platoon Raid Live Fire (PRLF), and Company Cordon and Search. Army Landing Craft Mediums (LCMs), Landing Craft Utility (LCUs), as well as CH-47, UH-60, and UH-1H helicopters were utilized to insert, move and exfiltrate soldiers from the field during week two. Week three, the final week of training, consists of a comprehensive Field Training Exercise (FTX). The FTX begins with and operations order (OPORD) issued from the brigade commander (JOTB) to the rotational battalion commander. The rotational battalion then conducts troop leading procedures (TLP) necessary to plan for the upcoming mission. The battalion then deploys to the field for three to five days. Again, different types of Army transportation assets are utilized during week three. The Jungle Warfare Course was repeated, in generally the same manner, eleven times during FY96. The second course offered at the JOTB is the Engineer Jungle Warfare Course (EJWC). This four week course is broken down into two weeks of field training for the rotational engineer company and two weeks of troop construction (mission related) for Fort Sherman. The two weeks of training covers engineer related individual, squad and platoon tasks, what would be performed in a jungle environment. The third course offered at the JOTB is the Air Crew Survival Course (ACS). Aircrews from Army aviation and Air Force units within Panama participate in the ACS, which is a ten (10) day event. In this course, up to 30 aircrew students learn basic survival techniques such as crossing water obstacles, land navigation, improvised tools and weapons, traps and snares, food procurement and preparation, and escape and evasion. The training culminates in a four day survival exercise designed to test the student’s ability to survive alone or in a small team should they find themselves in hostile territory. The JOTB is seeking to expand this course and offer it to pilots and crews world-wide. HISTORY BACKGROUND America was embroiled in the Cold War and the beginning of the Korean Conflict in April of 1951 when the Commanding General of the U.S. Army, Caribbean was given the mission "to keep the art of jungle warfare alive in the Army". Recent worldwide events demonstrated a need for proficiency in jungle operations. The French were struggling in the jungles of Indo-China against the Vietminh in hopes of reclaiming part of their pre Second World War empire. The British were successfully fighting a counterinsurgency war in the jungles of Malaysia, and the U.S. had recently fought numerous bloody campaigns in the tropics of the Burma-China-India Theater, and the South Pacific during World War Two (WWII). Given America’s interests and responsibilities as an emerging superpower, and our global focus, it was likely the United States would again be called on to wage war in a jungle environment. THE BEGINNINGS OF JUNGLE OPERATIONS AND TRAINING IN PANAMA Until the Second World War, many military experts believed that jungles were impenetrable and unsuitable for modern military operations. The successful Japanese attack on the British in Singapore through the Malaysian jungles in 1942 changed conventional thinking. However, American experiences in conducting training and maneuvers in the jungle began in 1916 with a cross Panama Isthmus trek by a U.S. Army infantry detachment. The defense of the Panama Canal required U.S. forces to operate and train in the jungle; thus elements of the U.S. Army serving in Panama had fairly extensive experience in jungle survival and movement prior to U.S. participation in WWII. The Japanese defeat of British forces during the early years of WWII caused an Army-wide examination of its ability to conduct operations in the jungle. The Panama Mobile Force (PMF) was the primary Army element with experience in jungle operations. The PMF aggressively promoted their abilities to the War Department in order to secure a role in America’s war effort. The PMF’s higher headquarters, the Caribbean Defense Command (CDC) expanded training in jungle operations after being tasked by the War Department to train 1500 replacements for the Pacific Theater; training camps were established at Pacora and Rio Hato, Panama. The first sixty-day training cycle was completed on 15 March 1943. While these sites provided valuable training, the terrain was not as rugged nor the vegetation as thick as that of most jungle in the Pacific. Another jungle training site was then established at Camp Pina, just south of Fort Sherman; the terrain at this site was as challenging as anything in the Pacific Theater. This site was used until the end of the war. Coincidentally, the most suitable area to conduct jungle warfare training under U.S. control at that time was Camp Pina (currently the Pina Range Complex) and Fort Sherman; the site of coastal artillery and anti-aircraft artillery batteries located on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal. The Fort Sherman Military Reservation covered an excess of fifty square miles of jungle and had an extensive infrastructure that included logistical and transportation systems. The combination of usable maneuver area and preexisting base facilities made Fort Sherman an ideal location for a jungle warfare school. The Original Bushmasters This is the unit that started jungle training in Panama. FORT SHERMAN AREA The areas used throughout the various incarnations of the U.S. Army jungle warfare school include Fort Sherman and the Pina Range Complex. Fort Sherman Military Reservation is bordered to the North and North-West by the Caribbean Sea, on the South and South-West by the Rio Chagres, and East by Limon Bay and Gatun Lake. It consists of 23,000 acres of single and double canopy jungle, which is cross-compartmentalized with steep rolling hills, numerous tributaries, mangrove swamps and coastline. The contonment area includes barracks and mess facilities, cadre headquarters and offices, a boathouse with docks, classroom and instruction sites, and recreation facilities. Training areas on the Fort Sherman Military Reservation include the maneuver area with several fortified or semi-permanent objectives, a jungle land navigation course, and jungle combat maneuver lanes, helicopter landing zones, a drop zone, and two coastal artillery batteries that have been converted into small arms ranges and special warfare training sites. The Pina Range Complex is immediately South of Fort Sherman, across the Rio Chagres. This complex includes several small arms live fire ranges and maneuver lanes, a mortar maneuver course, a live fire village, and a demolitions range. White Drop Zone and other areas of Gatun Lake are used for airborne insertions and small boat operations. The Rio Chagres is also used for small boat and tactical riverine operations and as part of the Sapper (light combat engineer) live demolitions maneuver course. The coastal artillery batteries and anti-aircraft gun emplacements on Fort Sherman were obsolete by the mid-1940s; most of the large caliber guns had not been fired in years. Attack from the air was the major threat, and mobile anti-aircraft guns and missiles, and motorized ground forces had replaced most of the static defenses of the Canal. This left Fort Sherman with a caretaker garrison and the primary mission to billet troops stationed on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal. The change in mission was another factor that made Fort Sherman a desirable location for jungle warfare training. ORIGINS OF A FORMAL JUNGLE SCHOOL The U.S. Army, Caribbean (USARCARIB) was still conducting limited jungle warfare and survival training for it’s forces, when they received the formal mission from the Department of the Army of "keeping the art of jungle warfare alive in the Army" in April of 1951. In compliance with this directive, USARCARIB issued Training Memorandum Number 9, which established a Jungle Warfare Training Board (JWTB). The JWTB was a study group "responsible for continued research and study, analysis, and reporting of final findings and recommendations on changes or additions to established U.S. Army doctrine and techniques of jungle warfare and equipment designed for jungle operations." Standards of individual and unit jungle training were also established. One major result of the JWTB’s study was the establishment of a provisional headquarters to plan, organize, and evaluate a 2,000 man, field training exercise. BRUSH BAY was conducted on Fort Sherman from 4 May to 4 June 1953. Elements of the 33rd Infantry, the 370th Engineer Amphibious Support Regiment, and the 45th Reconnaissance Battalion stationed in Panama were joined by nearly 1,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, organized in a Battalion Combat Team. The provisional HQ was replaced by the 7437th Army Unit, Jungle Warfare Training Center (JWTC) on 15 June 1953; this was the origin of the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC). In November of 1953 the JWTC was attached to the 33rd Infantry; its focus was to train Panama based soldiers in jungle warfare and survival. Improvements were made to Fort Sherman facilities, and formal training of the 33rd Infantry was begun in the Spring of 1954; the objective was to make the entire regiment proficient in jungle operations. In May of 1956 the 33rd Infantry was inactivated, and was replaced by the 20th Infantry Regiment, which inherited the JWTC and the mission of the 33rd Infantry. The majority of soldiers trained by the JWTC were from the Panama area, though CONUS based units were also being trained. An example of this was Exercise JUNGLE JIM, where a 1,200 man reinforced battalion combat team (2/188 AIR, 11th Airborne Division) received a month long (9 May to 7 June 1955) program of instruction (POI) and maneuvers very similar in scope of the POI used by the JOTC in the 1990s. In December of 1957, the JWTC began regular cyclic training of units from outside of the Panama area as part of the recently reorganized 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry; this established the Jungle Operations Course. The JWTC normally ran ten, three week long, cycles annually. Specialized cycles (some were taught completely in Spanish for instance) and support of training exercises also occurred in addition to the ten regular cycles. A normal cycle conducted training on three levels, individual soldier skills, small unit, and company. The bulk of the instruction was conducted for the infantry rifle company, but specialized training for a heavy weapons company, a heavy mortar company, a headquarters company, a combat engineer (Sapper) platoon, and a medical platoon was also available. Individual training included jungle survival, camouflage, navigation, mines and boobytraps, and jungle plants and living. Upon completion of the "core" classes, the training focus shifted to small unit patrolling, attack, and ambush tactics and techniques. Once the small unit was proficient in jungle operations, training moved to company and occasionally battalion level offensive field training exercises. By 1960 the JWTC had trained eleven infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, nine infantry companies, one mortar battery, three provisional non-commissioned officer groups, and three provisional officer groups from the Continental United States (CONUS). Concurrent with these cycles, numerous soldiers from the USARCARIB, LA Guardia National (Panamanian Police), numerous soldiers from Latin American countries, and American Special Warfare Units received jungle-specific training. On 1 July 1963 the mission and functions of the JWTC were assumed by the Jungle Operations Committee (JOC) of the School of the Americas, based at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, Panama (the JOC continued to operate at Fort Sherman). Fort Gulick was located approximately ten kilometers east of Fort Sherman, adjacent to the city of Colon. The JOC extended the course to five weeks in duration, with the emphasis in jungle survival skills, and less focus on tactics. The reduction in tactical operations was mainly due to a shortage of resources and trained cadre available from the School of the Americas. Fortunately, an influx of Special Forces qualified instructors and increased supervision from the 8th Special Forces Group, in late 1965, brought fundamental changes to the program of instruction. The course was shortened to two weeks in length, most of which was spent in the jungle, and the training focus returned to combat tactics, techniques, and procedures. VIETNAM AND JUNGLE WARFARE TRAINING Although highly beneficial to the survival and combat effectiveness of U.S. troops in Southeast Asia, the Jungle Operations Committee remained fairly low profile throughout the early 1960s. However as American involvement in Southeast Asia increased, so did the importance and utilization of the JOC. An example of this increase is number of students who graduated from the course. In FY 1961, about 1700 students graduated from the course; 9145 students graduated in FY 1967. One of the major reasons for this increase was the participation of 60 officers and non-commissioned officers from the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in July of 1966. Extensive positive feedback about the value of instruction was quickly brought to the attention of LTG Creighton Abrams, the U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff. Soon the Department of the Army (DA) increased the quota of trainees for the JOC, and agreed to increase instructors and funds late in 1967. A rapid increase in class size and number of two week cycles occurred before additional funds and manpower was provided by DA; one of the JOCs higher headquarters, U.S. Army South (USARSO) was tasked to provide additional resources in the interim. The Jungle Operations Committee continually took measures to improve the quality of instruction. In addition to conducting course after action reviews, the JOC sent questionnaires to officers and NCOs that deployed to Vietnam about 90 days after they had been in country; this questionnaire asked for a reappraisal of course curriculum based on their experiences (see Appendix C). The commentary received was very positive overall, but valuable suggestions were made that led to modifications in the course. In October 1965 a team from the USARSO G3 visited a jungle operations course being taught in Hawaii. The POI was similar to the Panama jungle operations course, but the Hawaii course included a cordon and search of a mock Vietnamese village; this was added to the Panamanian course. This program of cadre/instructor self-critique and rotational unit after-action reviews (with the goal of constantly refining the Jungle Operations Course) continued until the school was closed in 1999. JUNGLE OPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER DEVELOPMENT The Jungle Operations Committee, of the School of the Americas was separated by the Department of the Army on 1 July 1968, and became the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC). The JOTC was placed under operational control of the 8th Special Forces Group on 1 July 1970. In July of 1975 the JOTC became an independent major subordinate command within the 193rd Infantry Brigade. These were primarily administrative moves, with little impact on the content of the Jungle Operations Course. The school did receive other responsibilities in addition to running the JOC; a USARSO RECONDO course was established in March of 1969, and operation of the USARSO NCO academy was given to the JOTC in October 1971. The Jungle Operations Course was three weeks long throughout the early 1970’s with minor alterations in the POI; most of these were caused by technological improvements in night vision optics and heliborne mobility. Slots to the JOTC were given primarily to CONUS based light and airborne battalions. Slots were still allocated to individual soldiers in a manner similar to Airborne School. Organic units such as a squad from 1-504 Parachute Infantry Regiment did not attend the course. Soldiers from throughout the Army came to JOTC and were assigned to a provisional squad / platoon for the duration of the course. The jungle warfare skills learned and the opportunity for NCOs to test their leadership was undoubtedly very valuable, but a major change initiated in the mid-1970s vastly improved the benefits gained from attendance. The Jungle Operations Training Center was reorganized in Fiscal Year 1976 to train battalion sized units. The basic POI was still taught, but soldiers now attended all training with members of their organic teams, squads, and platoons. This did much to improve unit teambuilding and to enhance leadership skills of junior NCOs and officers. After core week training, platoons went through situational training exercises (STX) where squad and platoon leaders were placed in difficult tactical situations. These exercises, in addition to live fire ambushes and react to contact maneuver courses, honed the warfighting skills and esprit of the small unit. The third week added company and battalion level operations during a battalion led field training exercise (FTX). The FTX exercised the battalion command group, the battalion staff, and company leadership. Units experienced the challenges of command, control and logistics in the jungle. The overall benefits of a rotation to the JOTC were now battalion wide and covered almost all of the Battle Operating Systems. Rotations were sought after throughout the Army light infantry community and the Marine Corps. Additionally, many Special Operations units received training from JOTC instructors or used JOTC facilities while conducting internal training events. OPERATION JUST CAUSE The unit that operated the Jungle Operations Training Center was redesignated the Jungle Operations Training Battalion (JOTB) during the invasion of Panama in December 1989. The battalion was notified of possible contingency operations as tensions between the American and Panamanian governments increased, and prepared and trained accordingly. The JOTB was augmented with additional combat and combat support assets and as JUST CAUSE began, was designated Task Force Sherman. The task force served with the 3rd Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light) as part of Task Force Atlantic. Task Force Sherman successfully maintained the security and defense of Fort Sherman and the Gatun Locks complex, including numerous key communications and transportation facilities, the Gatun Locks, dam, spillway bridge, and hydroelectric plant. The Task Force also cleared and 27 towns and villages, and 140 kilometers of coastline. They conducted 19 air assaults and Civilian Military Operations in four villages. Patrols from Task Force Sherman eliminated all Hunter Platoons south of the Rio Chagres, captured numerous prisoners of war, weapons, and large amounts of ammunition and equipment. They cleared the town of Portobello, Isla Grande and other villages located north of Colon during a joint operation with Navy SEALs and Special Operations Aviation. Patrols continued until 12 January 1990, when Task Force Sherman became the reserve for Task Force Atlantic. The Jungle Operations Training Battalion was awarded a battle streamer for its actions during Operation JUST CAUSE, making it the only TDA unit in the U.S. Army to receive this distinction. THE JOTB IN THE 1990’s The JOTB returned to its primary mission of training light infantry units in the art of jungle warfare after Operation JUST CAUSE. By 1992, twelve light infantry jungle warfare courses, four engineer jungle warfare courses, and four aircrew survival courses were taught annually. In addition to these standard rotations, the JOTB provided support to numerous Special Operations units, U.S. Government, and law enforcement agencies. The JOTB fulfilled a critical role in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and USARSO military-to-military exchange programs (which included small unit exchanges, and guest instructor programs) that enhanced relations and aided our efforts to influence the further democratization of the Americas. Countries that participated in these programs included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The Jungle Warfare Course (JWC) was three weeks in duration and trained light infantry battalion task forces in jungle operations. The first week (core week) of training consisted of individual soldier skills and squad collective tasks that would be performed in a jungle environment. These tasks included: jungle plants and living, land navigation, mines and boobytraps, jungle combat techniques, waterborne operations, and squad react to contact live fire lanes. Scout, mortar, and combat engineer (Sapper) platoons received additional specialized training during core week. The second week consisted of situational training exercises (STX) which included platoon deliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, a company cordon and search, and Sapper, riverine demolition missions. A battalion field training exercise (FTX) was conducted during the third and final week of the JWC. This FTX was normally a four-day long, free-play exercise that pitted the training battalion against a company-sized opposition force (OPFOR). JOTB observer/controllers provided both the training battalion and the OPFOR company with continuous feedback through comprehensive after action reviews. The Engineer Jungle Warfare Course (EJWC) was similar in nature to the JWC, with additional focus on demolitions and mobility operations. The core week instruction was the same as the JWC, with the second week consisting of a four day FTX that required Sapper platoons to conduct numerous combat patrols, engineer reconnaissance missions, and route clearance missions on the Chagres River and jungle trails using live demolitions to reduce obstacles. The Sapper company would perform construction missions during the third and fourth weeks. These missions included basic masonry, carpentry, and pioneer tasks. The repair or replacement of foot bridges in the jungle, repair of boat docks, and construction of training sites are examples of some EJWC projects. The Air Crew Survival Course (ACS) was approximately two weeks in duration, and trained Army and Air Force aircrew personnel, U.S. Government, and law enforcement agencies in basic survival, escape and evasion techniques. Subjects included crossing water obstacles, improvised tools, weapons, traps, and snares, food procurement and preparation, and jungle navigation. The course culminated in a four day survival, escape, and evasion exercise designed to test the student’s ability to survive alone or in small groups, while in hostile territory. Due to the Army drawing down after Operation DESERT STORM, there were only two light infantry divisions, one air assault division, and one airborne division left on active duty. Numerous low-intensity conflicts and sustainment and stability operations in Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans showed the need for skilled light fighters. Many of the battalions that participated in these operations had gone through a JOTC rotation. The environmental experience from the conduct of jungle operations was not the only benefit gained from training at the JOTC. Teambuilding, the focus on small unit combat operations and numerous live fire exercises, honed the critical combat skills of many battalions that participated in these operations. The value of a JOTC rotation was recognized by all echelons of the "light fighter" community, from division commanders to team leaders. Infantry and Combat Engineer units from all CONUS based active Army, light, airborne, and air assault divisions, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the United States Marine Corps continued to compete for course rotations to the JOTB until its inactivation in 1999. U.S. ARMY JUNGLE OPERATIONS TRAINING BATTALION Fort Sherman was named by the War Department on 24 November 1911, in honor of General William Tecumseh Sherman. The mission of Fort Sherman through World War II was to provide a defense for the Atlantic port of Cristobal and the Gatun Locks. This defense, provided by Coastal Artillery, consisted of Batteries Mower, Stanley, Kilpatrick, Howard, Baird, Pratt and McKenzie, each of which housed either coastal guns or mortars. From 1946 to 1948, Fort Sherman served primarily to billet troops assigned to the Caribbean side of the isthmus. In April 1951, the Department of the Army assigned the U.S. Army Caribbean the mission of "keeping the art of jungle warfare alive in the Army." In compliance with this directive a provisional headquarters was established to conduct "Exercise Brush Bay" on the Fort Sherman Military Reservation. From this small beginning grew the groundwork for the U.S. Army’s Jungle Training School. The growth of the jungle school was not a rapid one. After operation "Brush Bay," the headquarters was disbanded, but the 7437th Army Unit was activated to care for the maneuver area and was attached to the 33rd Infantry Regiment. The facilities at Fort Sherman were improved in 1954, as units from the 33rd Infantry Regiment were being trained. The objective of this training was to make the entire regiment completely proficient in jungle operations. In May 1956, the 33rd Infantry was deactivated and replaced by the 20th Infantry Regiment, which inherited the mission of conducting jungle warfare training. Under this regiment, reorganized in December 1957 as the 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry, cycle training was conducted for military personnel outside the Panama area. Normally, ten training cycles, each three weeks in duration, were programmed annually. On 1 July 1963, the jungle school's mission and functions were assumed by the Jungle Operations Committee (JOC) of the newly redesignated U.S. Army School of the Americas, Fort Gulick, Canal Zone. Later, on 1 July 1968, the United States Army Jungle Operations Training Center (USAJOTC) was established to carry on the mission of training soldiers to conduct operations in a jungle environment. On 1 July 1970, the JOTC was placed under the operational control of the 8th Special Forces Group (Abn). In July 1975, the USAJOTC was designated an independent major subordinate command under the 193rd Infantry Brigade. In 1976, JOTC began the transition from an individual training center to a unit training center. Finally in January 1989, the unit which operates the JOTC became designated as the Jungle Operations Training Battalion (JOTB). The JOTB participated in "Operation JUST CAUSE" (December 1989 - January 1990) as part of Task Force SHERMAN, operationally controlled by Task Force ATLANTIC, The JOTB participated in "Operation JUST CAUSE" (December 1989 - January 1990) as part of Task Force SHERMAN, operationally controlled by Task Force ATLANTIC, 3rd Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light). The JOTB conducted successful security and defense missions of Fort Sherman and the Gatun Locks Complex; cleared and secured 27 towns and villages and 140 kilometers of coastline; conducted 19 separate air assault operations; conducted civil-military operations in 4 towns and villages; eliminated the threat from the "Hunter Platoons" south of the Rio Chagres and captured numerous enemy prisoners, weapons and large amounts of munitions and military equipment. For its contributions during "Operation JUST CAUSE", JOTB was awarded a battle streamer, the only TDA unit in the U.S. Army to receive this distinction. In December 1991, FORSCOM approved a rotation cycle reduction from 15 to 12 light infantry jungle warfare courses, 4 engineer warfare courses and 4 aircrew survival courses annually. Continued modifications to the TDA have allowed the JOTB to evolve over the past four years into the premier training center for keeping the "art of jungle warfare alive in the Army". This includes: increasing efforts to train Latin American allied armed forces as part of an overall regional military to military contact program; enhancing the realism of training by incorporating civilians into the battlefield; adding new live fire exercises; improving the instructor certification program and revalidating the flexible programs of instruction for units attending the training. In August 1994, JOTB was designated a dependent restricted tour area due to the implementation of the 1977 Treaty Implementation Plan. By October 1994, families were no longer allowed to be assigned on Fort Sherman. Beginning in the summer of 1995, transitioning efforts commenced on the Atlantic side of Panama which resulted in the closure of Fort Davis and Fort Espinar on 1 September 1995. This left Fort Sherman and the JOTB as the only significant U.S. presence on the Atlantic side of Panama. Steady efforts to improve the quality of life on Fort Sherman since the closure of Fort Davis and Espinar continued through FYs 96 and 97. EJWC The Engineer Jungle Warfare Course By Captain Andrew V. Jasaitis The Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC), located at Fort Sherman, Panama, trains infantry battalions and engineer companies to conduct jungle combat operations. One of the programs offered by JOTC is the Engineer Jungle Warfare Course (EJWC). The EJWC provides a unique opportunity for engineer companies and platoons to train in a jungle environment. The Jungle Operations Training Battalion normally supports four engineer company and ten engineer platoon rotations annually. The EJWC is open to almost any combat engineer company-airborne, air assault, wheeled, combat support equipment, combat heavy, etc. Most rotations are from corps-level engineer companies because divisional engineer platoons deploy and train with the Infantry Battalion Jungle Warfare Course rotations. The Jungle Operations Training Center's primary objective is to keep the art of jungle warfare alive in the Army today. In concert with this mission, the Engineer Jungle Warfare Course prepares engineers to fight future battles and win in a jungle environment. In addition to supporting U.S. Army combat engineers, the Engineer Jungle Warfare Course provides joint training to selected U.S. Marine Corps engineer platoons and some Latin American engineers. Program of Instruction The program of instruction for the EJWC is organized, manned, and equipped to provide training to three engineer platoons. Instructors from Alpha Company, Jungle Operations Training Battalion, conduct the training by committees. Team 6 provides instruction in engineer-specific tasks. The four-week EJWC consists of two weeks of combat training (core jungle training and tactical operations) and two weeks of construction (Army Facilities Components System-Tropical). Combat Training. Typical training during the first two weeks includes: jungle living, land navigation, mines and booby traps, jungle combat techniques, rappelling, advanced rigging and hauling, squad reconnaissance, squad react-to-contact (blank and live fire), waterborne and small-boat operations, basic and advanced demolitions, and platoon reconnaissance and demolition missions. Platoons also negotiate the rugged "Green Hell" obstacle course. The second week culminates in a two-day company field training exercise designed to meet the unit's mission essential task list (METL) training needs and to employ tactics, techniques, and procedures learned during core training. Company infiltration and movement is by several methods-landing craft, medium (LCM); F-470 Zodiacs, or Army aviation (air assault). Construction Training. The third and fourth weeks of the course are spent on construction missions, which include carpentry, concrete and masonry, plumbing, and construction management tasks. Projects include bridge repair or replacement; target, rappel tower, obstacle, boat dock, fence, cage, and roof construction; office and classroom renovation; and window installation. Units normally provide eight days of construction effort. All projects are designed to support the training center so that the Jungle Operations Training Battalion can continue to provide high quality training opportunities. OLD Army Article: Rangers get jungle training to help prepare for exercises Sgt. Marc Turchin FORT SHERMAN, Panama, (Army News Service, April 10, 1998) -- Soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment finished their first week of training consisting of a series of jungle training classes to prepare them for their upcoming field training exercises. The classes included mines and booby traps, waterborne operations; squad react to contacts, jungle living and land navigation. "The classes gave the ranger combat effectiveness for him and the unit," said Sgt. 1st Class Kenneth Wolfe, Jungle Operations Training Center instructor at one of the react to contact training sites. The mines and booby traps class had the rangers learning about what types of mines and traps are found in jungle terrain. They were also shown the correct way of walking through the terrain and how to spot the mines and traps. Following a short class, platoons were given a mission, which included azimuths and amounts of distance each platoon was expected to travel. The terrain had the platoons moving through thick vegetation, crossing over streams and climbing up and down hills. Some platoons found mines and traps while others bypassed them altogether. Cadre members said the idea was to see if the rangers could maneuver through the terrain properly and react to exploding training traps and mines correctly. "It pretty much made us aware of what's out there and what to look for," said Staff Sgt. John Donaldson, battalion reenlistment NCO. He said he learned about American made and foreign made traps and mines. "Foreign countries have different set ups than ours," he said. "Basically, anything in the jungle could be booby trapped." From booby traps to boats, rangers took classes on just about everything in between. Waterborne operations started with a swim test. Donaldson said this was done to ensure everyone was capable of conducting the training. After the swim test, the rangers learned the correct way of getting out of a parachute while in the water. Each ranger went under water with the parachute attached and was required to unhook himself. The soldiers then moved from the water to land to practice tying the proper knots needed for this type of training. Rangers stood in square configurations as waterborne instructors first demonstrated the tying procedures then watched as the rangers gave the knot tying a shot. When the knot tying class was finished, rangers moved to preparing their rucksacks for water carriage. The rucks were wrapped in watertight packages using ponchos. Each ranger was required to swim between 100 and 200 meters with the ruck attached to them. They also had to build poncho rafts with their rucksacks. Rangers swam in two-man teams with two rucksacks. The front man was attached to the rucks with a snap link and pulled the rafts as he swam while the back person pushed the rucks. The waterborne class also saw the rangers learning to build rope bridges and then cross them. Using six or seven-man squads, rangers put their newly acquired skills to use as they first set up the rope bridges on land to practice the procedure. They next had to do the same across a 25-meter water obstacle. The squads used three lanes to set up their rope bridges. After accomplishing the task at hand, the rangers conducted a competition to get back to where they started. The stakes had the second place squad doing 25 push-ups and the third place squad knocking out 50. But the rangers weren't through getting wet. Next was boat operations. They were given a class about how to capsize a zodiac boat. Donaldson said the main reason for capsizing the boat has to do with the jungle environment. "One of the reasons we'd have to capsize the boat would be due to heavy rains," he said. "We'd have to get the water out of the boat." To capsize the boat, the rangers have to go through a series of commands. "I'd have to say waterborne was the best of all the classes," Donaldson said. "It's been a couple of years since I last trained with the boats," he said. "Plus it gave mea chance to swim around a little bit." Donaldson described himself as a strong swimmer on the ranger swimming scale -- a less experienced swimmer is a non-swimmer, an average swimmer is called a swimmer and an experienced swimmer is called a strong swimmer. No matter how well the soldier could swim; the squad-react-to-contact class had the rangers totally submerged in jungle terrain testing how well each squad acted under fire from an enemy. This class also offered the rangers something most said they looked forward to -- their first live-fire in the deployment. Rangers first moved as squads through the jungle with their weapons loaded with blanks. An opposing force eventually ambushed the squad. Wolfe, who accompanied all squads at his training lane through the movement, said he was watching for good and bad actions. Whether the squad did well or bad, Wolfe discussed all aspects of the mission during the after action review. After one AAR, Wolfe said there's something special about working with rangers. "They're at a higher level of training compared to other light Infantry units," he said. "Being that I spent time in the regiment, I know they're whole life is centered around training." One Soldier said training in the jungle is like training nowhere else. "It makes it tougher to control your element," said Staff Sgt. Richard Clinton, squad leader with Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. "You can't see as well and you have to tighten things up and slow everything down." Although Clinton admitted most of his squad had never operated in the jungle, he said practice makes perfect. "They're getting a lot out of this," he said. "As they do it, they get more and more confident and that's the big thing with this -- building their confidence." Clinton said his squad did react well on its first time through, but it's an educating experience. "In anything we do, there's going to be learning points," he said. "That's the reason we're out here training." The training continued at the jungle living class. Here, rangers were introduced to habitats of the jungle. They watched as cadre showed slides at the post theater of animals and plant life the soldiers may run into while training in the jungle. For instance, Donaldson said he was worried about a certain frog that secretes a poisonous liquid out of its glands when it is agitated. "You have to be on your toes all the time," he said. "There's a lot of stuff that can mess you up." The rangers also walked through the post zoo, located near their barracks. There they saw crocodiles and a variety of monkeys and birds. All call Panama home. Some of that wildlife may have been seen during the land navigation course. Unlike the courses on Fort Benning, Donaldson said the maps don't show the small terrain features because of the rainy season. "The rainy season changes the way the terrain looks and that effected us getting to our second point." He said the first point was found pretty easily, but the second one took a while because his squad was basing their direction on pace count and terrain features. "We got disorientated at first, then found a spot on the map where we thought we were and 15 minutes later we found our point." Donaldson and a number of other soldiers blamed the terrain for their misfortunes. "You're fighting vines constantly," Donaldson said. "Visibility was no more than about 20 meters at best." The soldiers were required to find three of four points in less than three hours. In the end, the classes are designed to prepare the rangers for their field exercises during the second week of the deployment. But, Clinton said this type of training has other benefits. "We're out there doing raids, ambushes, movement to contacts, running patrol bases and moving from here to there," he said. "It's good learning for everyone -- especially the younger guys who still need to go to Ranger School." (Editor's note: Turchin is a writer with the U.S. Army Infantry Center and Fort Benning public affairs office at Fort Benning, Ga.)

Price: 10 USD

Location: New Kensington, Pennsylvania

End Time: 2024-11-10T18:27:46.000Z

Shipping Cost: 4 USD